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INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent joinder exists when a plaintiff includes a claim against a non-diverse
defendant, upon which the plaintiff has no hope of recovering, to prevent a diverse
defendant from removing the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.
2
The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court can ignore the
citizenship of a fraudulently joined defendant in determining whether the court has
diversity jurisdiction.3 The federal courts have not adopted a uniform test to
determine whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant.
4 All
agree, however, that the analysis is similar to that used to decide a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
5
The need for federal diversity jurisdiction has been long-debated because of its
implications for federalism and state sovereignty.
6 A 1969 American Law Institute
study noted that diversity jurisdiction resulted in state judicial power being less
extensive than state legislative authority.
7 The study highlighted that "[s]o long as
federal courts continue to decide cases arising under state law without the possibility
of state review, the state's judicial power is less extensive than its legislative power;
this is an undesirable interference with state autonomy."
8
Because questions of fraudulent joinder are analyzed much like a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly9 and Ashcroft v. lqbal
l° have led to additional
inconsistency in fraudulent joinder analysis and have further complicated the
federalism and state sovereignty concerns in cases that raise claims of fraudulent
joinder.1
In Twombly and Iqbal the Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint filed in
federal court must plead sufficient facts to show that the claim is plausible on its
2 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3723.1 (Rev. 4th ed. 2019).
' See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907); see also Coyne v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999); Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287
(1 th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d 863, 867 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
4 See E. Farish Percy, The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in the Wrong
Direction, 62 VILL. L. REv. 213, 222 24 (2017).
5 See Broadway v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 683 F. App'x 801, 803 (11 th Cir. 2017); Int'l Energy
Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., 818 F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Am.
Towers, L.L.C., 781 F.3d 693,704 (4th Cir. 2015); Hubbard v. Federated Mut. Ins., 799 F.3d 1224, 1227
(8th Cir. 2015); Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc., 765 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir.
2014); Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013); Walker v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 443
F. App'x 946, 954 (6th Cir. 2011); Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2013); Pampillonia v.
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998); Batoffv. State Farm Ins., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d
Cir. 1992); McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).
6 See E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case oflt: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based
on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 199-200 (2005).
7 AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURSDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 99 (1969).
81d.
9 See 550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007).
'0 See 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
" See Percy, supra note 4, at 234-36 (discussing the federalism concerns raised by the plausibility standard).
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face.12 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."13 Twombly and Iqbal arguably imposed a "plausibility"
pleading standard that is more difficult to meet than the notice-pleading standard
federal courts had previously applied.14 The majority of state courts, however, have
not adopted the Twombly/lqbal pleading standard. Instead, most states continue to
apply the more lenient notice-pleading standard."5 At least one federal court has
recognized that "[t]he applicable pleading standard ... can be dispositive of the
question of diversity jurisdiction" in cases involving claims of fraudulent joinder.6
A federal court might find fraudulent joinder if it applied the Twombly/Jqbal pleading
standard but find that the non-diverse defendant was properly joined if it applied a
state notice-pleading standard.'7 The possibility of conflicting results based on which
pleading standard the court applies has important implications for principles of
federalism and state sovereignty.
So, should a federal district court look to the state or federal pleading standard
when deciding whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant?
On the one hand, states have the authority to develop and apply their own procedural
rules and substantive law. Diversity jurisdiction interferes with a state's authority to
do those things. On the other, the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to protect
diverse citizens from the potential local bias of state courts.'8 Also, Congress has the
authority to regulate the procedures applicable in federal court and to establish,
within constitutional limits, the jurisdiction of federal courts. There is also a strong
federal interest in ensuring uniform procedures for federal courts.
Two circuit courts of appeals have addressed the question of the applicable
pleading standard in a fraudulent joinder analysis in published opinions and they
reached opposite conclusions.'9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
federal district courts must look to the state pleading standard;21 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that federal district courts must apply the heightened
12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
13 id.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 23-30.
15 Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & lqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File? A Study
Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEx. TECH L. REv. 827, 855 (2013).
" In re Regions Morgan Keegan Securities, Derivative, and ERISA Litig., No. 2:09-MD-2009-SHM,
2013 WL 2404063, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2013) (citation omitted).
17 Id. at *11.
8 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
'9 Compare Stillwell v. Allstate Ins., 663 F.3d 1329, 1334 (1 1th Cir. 2011) ("To determine whether
it is possible that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action, we must necessarily
look to the pleading standards applicable in state court, not the plausibility pleading standards prevailing
in federal court."), with Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., 818 F.3d 193,
200-02 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that precedent dictates the federal pleading standard is used to determine
whether a complaint states a cause of action). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Twombly/lIqbal standard in an unpublished opinion. Roggio v. McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter,
415 F. App'x 432, 433 (3d Cir. 2011).
20 Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334 ("To determine whether it is possible that a state court would find that
the complaint states a cause of action, we must necessarily look to the pleading standards applicable in
state court, not the plausibility pleading standards prevailing in federal court.").
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Twombly/Iqbal standard.21 Courts in other jurisdictions are split on which pleading
standard to apply to questions of fraudulent joinder.
22
This Article examines the split among the district courts within the Sixth Circuit
to illustrate and discuss whether federal courts should apply the forum state's
notice-pleading standard or the heightened Twombly/Iqbal federal pleading standard
to questions of fraudulent joinder. This Article proposes that federal courts should
apply the state pleading standard and adopt a uniform test for fraudulent
joinder--the "state-court failure-to-state-a-claim" test. Under this test, the federal
district court would ask whether the claim against the non-diverse defendant would
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted in state court. If it would, then the non-diverse defendant has not been
fraudulently joined, and the case should be remanded to state court. When applying
the state pleading standard, the federal district court should resolve any ambiguities
in state law or questions about the propriety of removal in favor of remand. The
state-law failure-to-state-a-claim test will ensure that federal diversity jurisdiction is
exercised in conformity with the constitutional limits prescribed by Article 111,
Section 2 of the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. The test also respects
the principles of federalism and state sovereignty.
Part I of this Article discusses the federal pleading standard before and after
Twombly and Iqbal and the notice pleading standard that prevails in most state courts.
Part II provides an overview of diversity jurisdiction, discusses the fraudulent joinder
exception to the complete diversity requirement, and identifies forum shopping
issues that arise from diversity jurisdiction. Next, in Part 111, the Article provides
details of a case to illustrate the issue of the applicable pleading standard for a
fraudulent joinder analysis. The split in the courts over the applicable standard is
discussed in Part IV. Part V proposes that federal courts apply the forum state's
pleading standard and adopt the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test to analyze
fraudulent joinder. This part also discusses potential problems with other proposed
tests. The conclusion summarizes the reasons the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim
test is the appropriate test.
I. NOTICE PLEADING AND TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
A. The pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Before the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts
applied a "notice pleading" standard to determine whether a complaint stated a claim
21 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 200.
22 See Greenberg v. Macy's, No. 11-4132, 2011 WL 4336674, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15,2011) ("This
does not end the fraudulent joinder inquiry, however. In deciding whether to remand, some district courts
have applied the 'heightened pleading standard' set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly." (citations omitted)); see also Texas Ujoints, L.L.C. v. Dana Holding Corp., No. 13-C-1008,
2013 WL 6230675, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 2, 2013); McConnell v. Funk, No. 2:10-cv-97KS-MTP, 2010
WL 4736257, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 16, 2010); Positive Results Mktg. v. Buffalo-Lake Erie Wireless
Sys. Co., No. 3:CV-08-0382, 2008 WL 2096865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2008).
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upon which relief could be granted.23 Under the notice pleading standard, the
complaint had to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim was and the grounds for the claim.24 A
claim would be dismissed only if "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff
[could] prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle him to
relief.-25 Twombly and Iqbal changed that.
In Twombly and Iqbal the Supreme Court considered the interaction of the
pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)26 and the standard
federal courts must apply when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).27 The Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff had to plead sufficient facts that,
when "accepted as true," would "state a claim [for] relief that [was] plausible on its
face. '2 8 So, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is no longer enough to
simply "offer[] 'labels and conclusion,' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action.' 29 Plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to show that there is "more
than a sheer possibility" that the defendant is liable.3"
There is, of course, a debate about the practical effect of Twombly and lqbal.31
Some studies have found that Twombly and Iqbal have not had a statistically
significant effect on dismissal rates; other studies have reached the opposite
conclusion.32 Whatever the statistical effect, the split in the district courts on whether
to apply the state pleading standard or the federal pleading standard demonstrates
that district court judges think the Twombly/lIqbal standard is significantly different
than the notice-pleading standard.
23 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
24 Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
2 1 Id. at 45-46.
26 The Rule provides:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
27 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 78 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
29 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
30 id.
31 Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2119
(2015) ("The central question that continues to be widely debated is whether the introduction of Iqbal and
Twombly's plausibility framework has significantly affected the outcome of litigation in district courts.").32Id. at 2119-20.
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B. State courts continue to apply a notice-pleading standard.
The majority of states continue to apply a notice-pleading standard
post-Twombly/lIqbal.33 For example, the states that make up the Sixth Circuit
(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) have adopted rules of civil procedure
that are modeled after the Federal Rules,
34 but none have followed the United States
Supreme Court's lead and adopted the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard.
5 Instead,
the state courts in those jurisdictions continue to apply a notice-pleading standard
when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.36 Under the state notice-pleading standard, just as under the former
federal notice pleading standard, a plaintiff who joins a non-diverse defendant to her
state court action need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim that
would give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds for it.
37
II. FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: AN OVERVIEW
A. The historical basis of diversity jurisdiction
Article 1I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over
"controversies. . . between citizens of different States.'38 Writing in Federalist No.
" Curry & Ward, supra note 15, at 855; see also Danielle Lusardo Schantz, Access to Justice: Impact
ofTwombly & Iqbal on State Court Systems, 51 AKRON L. REv. 951, 964-65 (2017) (explaining that out
of 30 replica jurisdictions, "[f]ive have chosen to ... adopt [the] plausibility pleading," "seven have
remained committed to notice pleading," and "[t]he remaining 18 jurisdictions ... continue to utilize
notice pleading by default").
34 Whaley v. Whitaker Bank, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Ky. App. 2008) ("The Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Miller v. Chapman Contracting,
730 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Mich. 2007); Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 49 N.E.3d 1224, 1230 (Ohio 2015)
("Because the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
federal law interpreting the federal rule is appropriate and persuasive authority in interpreting a similar
Ohio rule."); Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259, 262 (Tenn. 2009) ("The Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1970 and were modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to their
1970 amendments.").
35 See Hardin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 558 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Ky. App. 2018) (applying the notice-pleading
standard); Johnson v. QFD, Inc., 807 N.W2d 719,726 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("Michigan is a notice-pleading state.
All that is required is that the complaint set forth 'allegations necessary reasonably to inform the adverse party of the
nature ofthe claims the adverse party is called on to defend[.]' (citation omitted)); Smiley v. City of Cleveland, No.
103987,2016 WL 6673178, at * 1 (Ohio Ct App. Nov. 10, 2016) ("It is important to note that Ohio has not adopted
the heightened federal pleading standard outlined in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which
requires a plaintiff to plead sufficient facts that state a 'plausible' claim for relief." (citation omitted)); Webb v.
Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) ('qis case squarely presents the
question of whether Tennessee should adopt tie federal Twombly/lIqbal plausibility pleading standard. Although
federal judicial decisions 'interpreting rules similar to our own are persuasive authority for purposes of construing
the Tennessee nile,' they 'are non-binding even when the state and federal rules are identical.' We decline to adopt
the new plausibility standard and adhere, for the following reasons, to the notice pleading standard and the principles
discussed in section 1 above that have long governed Tennessee pleading practice." (citations omitted)).
36 See cases cited supra note 35.
37 See cases cited supra note 35.
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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80, Alexander Hamilton said that diversity jurisdiction was necessary to protect the
privileges and immunities of citizens of different states:
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion
and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed
to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be
impartial between the different States and their citizens, and which, owing
its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias
inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.39
The First Congress gave effect to Article 1I, Section 2 in the Judiciary Act of 1789
and provided that federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over
suits "between a citizen of the State where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen of
another State" when the amount in controversy exceeded $500.40 In 1806, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, interpreted the Judiciary
Act of 1789 and held that complete diversity must exist for a federal court to exercise
diversity jurisdiction41 :
The words of the act of congress are, 'where an alien is a party; or the suit
is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another state.' The court understands these expressions to mean that each
distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled
to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts. That is, that where the interest
is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent
to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts.42
This means that "diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a
citizen of a different State from each plaintiff."'43
The First Congress also provided for removal of cases from state court to federal
court when the plaintiff sued an out-of-state defendant and the amount in controversy
exceeded the monetary threshold.' Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144145 and
1446.46
39 Id; see also Charles J. Cooper & Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Complete Diversity and the Closing of
the Federal Courts, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 295 -96 (2014).
40 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. Today the amount in controversy must exceed
$75,000.28. U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018).
41 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati, &
Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).
42 id.
43 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978).
44 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73.
4' 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2018).
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B. Fraudulentjoinder as an exception to the complete diversity requirement
The United States Supreme Court has recognized fraudulent joinder as an
exception to the complete diversity requirement.
47 If the removing defendant can
show that a non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined, the federal district court
can ignore the citizenship of the non-diverse defendant when deciding whether the
court has subject-matter jurisdiction.48
The phrase "fraudulent joinder" is a misnomer, but it "has become a term of
art."'49 The removing party need not show that the plaintiff harbored some improper
motive in joining the non-diverse defendant or that the plaintiff's action in joining
the non-diverse defendant was fraudulent in the legal sense of the term.
° In short,
the plaintiff's motive is immaterial.5 The test is "a proxy for establishing the
plaintiff's fraudulent intent. If the plaintiff has no hope of recovering against the
non-diverse defendant, the court infers that the only possible reason for the plaintiffs
claim against [that defendant] was to defeat diversity and prevent removal."
52 Of
course, if the removing party can show actual fraud in the plaintiff s joinder of a non-
diverse defendant, then removal is proper.53
The federal circuit courts apply different tests to determine whether a plaintiff
has fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant.
54 As one author has noted, most
circuit courts use similar, though not identical, tests that consider related factors:
Most courts employ some variant of the following four predominant tests
to determine fraudulent joinder: (i) the "reasonable basis for the claim"
test that focuses on whether there is a reasonable basis in law and fact for
the claim against the [non-diverse defendant], (ii) the "no possibility" of
recovery test that asks whether there is any possibility the plaintiff will
recover from the [non-diverse defendant], (iii) the "reasonable
possibility" of recovery test that asks whether there is any reasonable
possibility the plaintiff will recover from the [non-diverse defendant], and
(iv) the failure to state a claim test that focuses on whether the complaint
states a claim against the [non-diverse defendant] pursuant to state law.
55
When a federal district court is deciding a claim of fraudulent joinder, "disputed
questions of fact and [any] ambiguities in the controlling ... state law" must be
47 See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185- 86 (1907).
48 Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d 863, 867 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
49 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3641.1 (3d ed. 2019).
50 Id.
5' Jackson, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 867.
52 In re Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 889 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936 37 (E.D.
Ky. 2012) (quoting Smith v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 11-56-ART, 2011 WL 2731262, at *5 (E.D.
Ky. July 13, 2011).
" Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Fraudulent joinder is established by
showing: (1) actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts; or (2) inability of the [plaintiff] to establish a
cause of action against the non-diverse [defendant].").
54 Percy, supra note 4, at 222- 23.
5 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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construed "in favor of the non removing party, 5 6 and "[a]ll doubts as to the propriety
of removal [must be] resolved in favor of remand."57
C. Diversity jurisdiction and forum shopping
Plaintiffs often prefer state court58 and research suggests with good reason.5 9 One
study compared plaintiff success rates in civil cases filed in federal court with the
plaintiff's success rates in cases removed from state court to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction.6 ° The study found that the plaintiff won 57.97% of the civil
cases they filed in federal court, but only 36.77% of those cases removed from state
court to federal court.
6 1
If a plaintiff files her action in state court and complete diversity exists, a
defendant may remove the case to federal court.62 Most cases that are removed to
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction remain there. For example, between
April 5, 2016 and April 5, 2019, 4,123 cases were removed from state courts to
federal district courts within the Sixth Circuit based on diversity jurisdiction.63
Disposition data was available for 2,751 of those cases.' Of those 2,751 cases, more
than 85% remained in federal court.65 In other words, federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction decided 2,360 cases that plaintiffs wanted their state courts to
hear.
66
Cases removed from state court to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction
make up a small, although not insignificant, part of a federal district court's docket.67
The threat of removal creates an incentive for plaintiffs to seek to join a non-diverse
defendant, which precludes removal to federal court. There is also an incentive for
defendants to remove cases to federal court and argue that the plaintiff fraudulently
56 Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Alexander v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994)).
57 Id. (citing Alexander, 13 F.3d at 949).
58 Victor E. Flango, Attorneys' Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L.
REV. 41, 63 (1991) ("If their opponent is from out of state, most attorneys (70% of the attorneys in the
state sample and 63% in the federal sample) who consider resident status important prefer to file [their
cases] in state court.").
51 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 599-600 (1998);
Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs' Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009) (concluding that "[f]orum selection is often the most
important strategic decision a party makes in a lawsuit").
60 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 59, at 598-99.
61 Id. at 593.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018).
63 Data obtained from the Federal Judicial Center Integrated Database.
64 Data obtained from the Federal Judicial Center Integrated Database. The date range used here was
selected to limit the results to 5,000 or less because FJCID only permits file downloads of 5,000 or less.
65 Data obtained from the Federal Judicial Center Integrated Database. Only 391 of the 2,751 cases
were remanded to state court.
66 During the same period, 66,085 cases were filed in those federal courts; thus, about 6.2% of the
courts' dockets was made up of cases removed based on diversity jurisdiction.
67 According to statistics from the Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Database, 278,684 civil cases
were filed in federal court between January 1,2018 and December 31, 2018. Of those, 21,406 or 7.68%
were cases that were removed from state courts based on diversity jurisdiction.
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joined the non-diverse defendant. These conflicting incentives lead to litigation over
the question of fraudulent joinder and there seems to have been an increase in
litigation on this issue.68 One study found that the number of district court cases from
the Fifth Circuit that referred to "fraudulent joinder" nearly tripled between 1990 and
2004.69 Another study found an increase in fraudulent joinder litigation post-
Twombly/Iqbal.70 One sample showed that the question of fraudulent joinder arises
in about 6.5% of cases removed from state courts within the Sixth Circuit based on
diversity jurisdiction. The applicable pleading standard has the potential to affect a
significant number of cases.
11. CLAIMS OF FRAUDULENT JOINDER-AN EXAMPLE
Bertin-Resch v. U.S. Medical Management, L.L.C.71 illustrates the problem of
whether federal district courts should analyze fraudulent joinder in light of the state
or federal pleading standard. Margaret Bertin-Resch filed a lawsuit in state court in
which she alleged the following: She was employed as a practice manager by U.S.
Medical Management, LLC.72 U.S. Medical Management also employed a
physician, who had a history of bizarre behavior, and Melina Brown, who was
Bertin-Resch's supervisor.73 One day the doctor came into the office and demanded
that Bertin-Resch use her identity to wire money to the doctor's friend.
74
Bertin-Resch refused, and the doctor became enraged.75 He screamed at
Bertin-Resch and engaged in other conduct, including throwing a phone at her, that
"caused Bertin-Resch to fear for her safety."7 6 When the doctor left the office,
Bertin-Resch locked the door and called her supervisor, Melina Brown, and told
Brown what had happened.77 Bertin-Resch told Brown that she was afraid of the
doctor. 78 Brown then came to the office, unlocked the door, and let the doctor back
into the office.79 Bertin-Resch feared for her safety, so she left the office.
80 She was
fired the next day.81
Bertin-Resch sued U.S. Medical Management, the doctor, and Brown in the
Court of Common Pleas in Mahoning County, Ohio.82 She alleged claims of
65 Percy, supra note 4, at 213.
69 Percy, supra note 6, at 240.
Kevin L. Pratt, Twombly, lqbal, and the Rise of Fraudulent Joinder Litigation, 6 CHARLESTON L.
REv. 729, 762 63 (2012) (finding that nearly forty percent of opinions on fraudulent joinder were issued
after Twombly and lqbal were decided). A Westlaw search of the Sixth Circuit database using the search
(fraud! /s join!) & DA (Aft 04-04-2016) yielded 313 cases.
7 Bertin-Resch v. U.S. Med. Mgmt, L.L.C., No. 4:15CV0090, 2015 WL 5595201 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22,2015).
72 Id. at * 1.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at *2.
78 id.
79 id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at * 1.
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wrongful termination and negligent hiring and retention against U.S. Medical
Management, assault and battery against the doctor, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Brown.83 Bertin-Resch and Brown were citizens of Ohio.84
U.S. Medical Management was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Michigan.85 The doctor was a citizen of South Carolina.86 U.S. Medical
Management and Brown removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio and argued that Bertin-Resch had fraudulently joined
Brown, i.e., had included a claim against Brown solely to defeat diversity
jurisdiction.87 Bertin-Resch moved to remand the case to state court.88 Because
Bertin-Resch and Brown were both Ohio citizens, the federal district court had to
determine whether Bertin-Resch had fraudulently joined Brown.89
Courts in the Sixth Circuit apply the "reasonable basis for the claim" test to
decide questions of fraudulent joinder.90 Under this test, the removing defendant
must present sufficient evidence to show that the "plaintiff could not have established
a cause of action against [the] non-diverse defendant[] under state law."91 Thus, in
Bertin-Resch, the district court had to determine whether there was a reasonable basis
to predict that Bertin-Resch might succeed on her claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Brown, i.e., whether Bertin-Resch's complaint stated a
colorable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Brown under
Ohio law.92
U.S. Medical Management, Brown, and Bertin-Resch disagreed about whether
the federal district court had to consider the federal Twombly/Jqbal pleading standard
or the Ohio notice-pleading standard when conducting its fraudulent joinder
analysis.93 U.S. Medical Management and Brown argued that the federal district
court had to look to the heightened Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard.94 Bertin-Resch
pointed out that Ohio had not adopted the Twombly/lqbal standard, but had instead
retained the notice-pleading standard, so she argued that the federal district court had
to apply Ohio's notice-pleading standard.95 The Sixth Circuit has not addressed this
question,96 and the district courts within the Sixth Circuit are split on the issue.97
83 id
84 id.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 id.
88 Id.
'9 id. at *2.
90 Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994)).
91 Id
92 Bertin-Resch, 2015 WL 5595201, at *2, *5.
93 Id. at *34.
94 Id. at *4.
9' Id. at *3.
96 Id. at *4; see also Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d 863, 868 (M.D. Tenn.
2014) ("To add another layer of complexity, it does not appear that the Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated
whether district courts assessing fraudulent joinder should consider the claims in light of the pleading
standard applicable in state court rather than the federal pleading standard (if they differ).").97Bertin-Resch, 2015 WL 5595201, at *4. Compare Smith v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., No. 1:13-
CV-207, 2014 WL 3715125, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2014) (applying the state pleading standard),
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In Bertin-Resch, the federal district court was able to avoid deciding whether the
state or federal pleading standard applied. The court found that the complaint
articulated the factual basis for Bertin-Resch's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim and thus, the complaint met both the notice-pleading standard required
by Ohio state courts and the heightened pleading standard required by Twombly and
Iqbal.98 As a result, the federal district court determined that Bertin-Resch had not
fraudulently joined Brown and remanded the case to state court.
99 But the pleading
standard the federal court chooses to apply can determine whether a case remains in
federal court or is remanded to state court when removal is based on a claim of
fraudulent joinder.'0 0
IV. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed the question of
whether the Twombly/Iqbal federal pleading standard or the state notice-pleading
standard applies to questions of fraudulent joinder. The Eleventh Circuit held that
the state pleading standard applies;' the Fifth Circuit held that federal district courts
must apply the Twombly/Iqbal standard.'0 2 Neither court discussed the federalism or
state sovereignty implications of its decision. The Eleventh Circuit simply concluded
that federal courts must necessarily use the state pleading standard to determine
whether it is possible that a state court would find that the complaint stated a cause
of action.0 3 The Fifth Circuit concluded that its precedent and practical
considerations required the application of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard.' 
Not surprisingly, district courts outside of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits are split
on whether to look to the federal or state pleading standard when deciding questions
of fraudulent joinder. The split among the federal district courts within the Sixth
Circuit exemplifies the issue.'05
Worrix v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-111-ART, 2013 WL 6834719, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 23, 2013) (applying
the state pleading standard), and In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., Nos.
2:09-md-2009-SHM, 2:10-cv-02260-SHM-dkv, 2013 WL 2404063, at *12-13 (W.D. Tenn. May 31,
2013) (applying the state pleading standard), with Bell v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 3:16CV984, 2016 WL
5118294, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2016) (applying the federal pleading standard and noting that its
application could make a difference), Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 2:15-CV-
2845, 2016 WL 3355456, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016) (applying the federal pleading standard), and
Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1: 11 dp 20275, 2012 WL 1945603, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 30,
2012) (applying the federal pleading standard).
" Bertin-Resch, 2015 WL 5595201, at *4 ("Plaintiffs Complaint clearly articulates the factual basis
for her lIED claim as opposed to merely reciting conclusory legal statements ... .
99 Id. at *6.
100 See In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., 2013 WL 2404063, at *1 1.
101 Stillwell v. Allstate Ins., 663 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11 th Cir. 2011).
102 Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193,200,208 (5th Cir. 2016).
103 Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334.
1o4 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 208.
105 See cases cited supra note 97.
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In the Sixth Circuit, questions of fraudulent joinder are decided, with one
exception,10 6 based on the allegation in the complaint.'0 7 According to the Sixth
Circuit, the analysis is similar to that used to decide a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).'°8 So the applicable pleading standard
(federal or state) is relevant to the fraudulent joinder analysis. Because the state
courts within the Sixth Circuit still use the notice-pleading standard, however, there
is a split among the district courts within the Sixth Circuit as to "whether state or
federal law applies when testing the sufficiency of the pleadings on a fraudulent
joinder inquiry."' 09
Federal district courts that apply the state notice-pleading standard tend to
recognize that the plaintiff is the master of her complaint and that applying the
federal standard would nullify "the lenient grounds on which a plaintiff may obtain
remand back to state court."" 0 At least one court has discussed the federalism
concerns that would arise if the federal pleading standard were applied."' The
district courts that choose to apply the federal pleading standard generally assert that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and thus the Twombly/lIqbal standard) apply to
a civil action after it is removed from state court to federal court."12
V. THE STATE-COURT FAILURE-TO-STATE-A-CLAIM TEST
A. The needfor uniformity
The federal courts have not adopted a uniform standard for analyzing questions
of fraudulent joinder,"3 and the issue has been complicated by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. The split among the federal courts demonstrates
that the current tests for fraudulentjoinder can be difficult to apply.1 4 As an example,
" The court can pierce the pleadings and consider summary-judgment-type vidence to determine if"there are
'undisputed facts that [would] negate the claim. "' Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Walker v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 443 F. App'x 946, 955-56 (6th Cir. 2011)).
'07 See Walker, 443 F. App'x at 952, 956 ("[T]he district court's evaluation of the nature and
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Plaintiffs' claims against the Kentucky Defendants went beyond
the inquiry contemplated by the limited pleading-piercing exception recognized as appropriate where an
undisputed factual inaccuracy or insufficiency in the plaintiff's claim against the in-state defendant is the
basis of removal.").
'0' Id. at 954 ("[T]he proper standard for evaluating that evidence remains akin to that of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and is arguably even more deferential.").
'0o9 Bertn-Resch v. U.S. Med. Mgmt, L.L.C., No. 4:15CV0090, 2015 WL 5595201, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept 22,
2015); see also Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d 863, 868-69 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting a split
of authority among the district courts within the Sixth Circuit and that the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly addressed
the question.)
0 Jackson, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 868-69.
H1See id. at 869.
12 Id. at 868 (citing cases applying the Twombly/lqbal standard); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(l)
("These rules apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court.").
13 Percy, supra note 4, at 222-23.
114 See Jackson, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 867 ("As at least some district courts within this circuit have
observed, applying the fraudulent joinder standard can be a difficult inquiry, because the Sixth Circuit's
'reasonable basis' and 'colorable cause of action' standard leaves room for debate as to how deferential a
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the Sixth Circuit's "reasonable basis to predict" test purports to look to the standard
applicable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, but then says that the "reasonable basis to predict" test is "arguably even
more deferential" than the test for a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim. 115
The Sixth Circuit has not explained how much more deference is required by the
"reasonable basis to predict" test. Further, the split on whether to look to the federal
pleading standard or the state pleading standard demonstrates the need for a uniform
test.
Because claims of fraudulent joinder necessarily implicate federalism and state
sovereignty issues, the federal courts should adopt a uniform test that both respects
the authority of state courts to decide questions of state law and ensures that plaintiffs
do not file obviously meritless claims against non-diverse defendants solely to defeat
diversity jurisdiction. The federal courts should follow the Eleventh Circuit's lead
and adopt a test that asks whether the claim against the non-diverse defendant would
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if the state court were deciding the question. If the claim against the
non-diverse defendant would survive a motion to dismiss in state court, then the
non-diverse defendant has not been fraudulently joined and the case should be
remanded to state court. In applying the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test, the
federal courts should continue to apply the rules that disputed questions of fact and
any ambiguities in the controlling state law must be construed in favor of the
non-removing party1 16 and that "[a]ll doubts as to the propriety of removal [must be]
resolved in favor of remand."
'' 17
The state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test would be easy to apply because it is
a test that is familiar both to courts and counsel. It is also consistent with the limited
jurisdiction of federal courts and respects and preserves the authority of state courts.
B. The state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test comports with
principles offederalism.
Under our system of federalism, state courts construe state rules of civil
procedure and federal courts construe federal rules of civil procedure."
8 States are
also free to develop their own substantive law, and federal courts sitting in diversity
court should be in evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims for fraudulent joinder purposes, short'
of applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.").
'"5 Walker v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 443 F. App'x 946, 954-55 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he proper
standard for evaluating that evidence remains akin to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and is
arguably even more deferential.")
116 Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999).
117 id.
s Bahen v. Diocese of Steubenville, No. 11 JE 34, 2013 WL 2316640, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 24,
2013) ("Consistent with federalism, it is the Ohio Supreme Court, rather than the United States Supreme
Court, which has the sole authority to construe Ohio civil procedure. There is no Supremacy Clause
conflict here; each court has the constitutional autonomy to construe the rules of pleadings governing
cases filed in, respectively, Ohio and the federal courts.").
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must apply state substantive law to state claims based on state law.119 Federal courts
sitting in diversity apply the federal rules of procedure unless doing so would violate
constitutional restrictions.
120
At first blush, the question of fraudulent joinder seems to be a question of
procedure. This misconception is exacerbated because we discuss fraudulent joinder
in conjunction with procedural rules such as removal and remand and because federal
courts analogize fraudulent joinder analysis to the Federal Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.
But when examined more closely, it becomes clear that the question of fraudulent
joinder is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction-which court has lawful authority
to hear and resolve the claim? The procedural rules are simply used as proxies to
answer that subject-matter jurisdiction question.
"It is a long-recognized principle that federal courts sitting in diversity 'apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law."'' 121 It is not always easy to
distinguish between state substantive law and federal procedural law, however.22
The Rules Enabling Act grants the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure ... for cases in the United States district courts."' 23
According to the Act, "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge[,] or modify any
substantive right.' 124 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., the Supreme Court recognized that
"Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal
courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts
authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United
States.1 25
In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress has properly
granted it the authority to promulgate rules of procedure and that the test for the
validity of such rules is whether the "rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them. '126 The Hanna
court also recognized that a federal court cannot apply the Federal Rules when doing
so would violate the Constitution.127 Similarly, in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Supreme Court held that in a diversity
"
9 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) ('Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There
is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.'); see also Lukowski v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 416 F.3d 478,484 (6th Cir. 2005) ("A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of
the state in which it sits." (quoting Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560,566 (6th Cir. 2001))).
120 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
121 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465).
122 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 ("The line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal
context changes.").
123 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018).
124 Id. § 2072(b).
125 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (footnote omitted).
126 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
127 Id. at 471.
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case, when there is a direct conflict between a state procedural rule and a federal
procedural rule, the federal rule controls unless the federal rule runs afoul of the
Rules Enabling Act.'28
The Supreme Court's decisions in Sibbach, Hanna, and Shady Grove do not
require federal courts to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the federal
pleading standard to questions of fraudulent joinder;
29 nor do they prohibit applying
a test based on a state pleading standard. First, the Federal Rules do not address the
question of fraudulent joinder, so the rules are inapplicable. Second, even if the
Federal Rules required federal courts to apply the Twombly/lqbal federal pleading
standard to the question of fraudulent joinder, applying that standard would expand
the federal court's jurisdiction beyond the limits established by Article IlI, Section 2
and violate the Rules Enabling Act. Thus, under the reasoning of Sibbach, Hanna,
and Shady Grove, the state procedural rule would control.
While Sibbach, Hanna, and Shady Grove do not provide an answer to the
question of whether federal courts should apply the federal or the state pleading
standard when analyzing questions of fraudulent joinder, another Supreme Court
case, Willy v. Coastal Corporation,130 does. In Willy, the Court said:
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, authorizes the Court to
"prescribe general rules of practice and procedure ... for cases in the
United States district courts ... " Those rules may not "abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right." In response, we have adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 governs their scope. It provides
that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts
in all suits of a civil nature ... " Rule 81(c) specifically provides that the
Rules "apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts
from the state courts and govern procedure after removal." This expansive
language contains no express exceptions and indicates a clear intent to
have the Rules... apply to all district court civil proceedings.
131
While Willy said that Rule 81 (c)'s "expansive language" "indicates a clear intent to
have the [Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] . . . apply to all district court civil
proceedings,'' | 32 that was not the end of the Court's analysis.
The next step of the analysis, as the Court explained in Willy, is to determine
whether applying the federal rule would impermissibly expand the federal court's
jurisdiction:
[l]n Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., we observed that federal courts, in adopting
rules, were not free to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a
statute. Such a caveat applies afortiori to any effort to extend by rule the
128 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2015).
129 See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party Problem in
Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 813 (2006) ("Nothing in Hanna v. Plumer, the Rules Enabling
Act, or any other component of the Erie doctrine interjects the Federal Rules into the interpretation or
application of the federal jurisdictional statutes." (footnotes omitted)).
130 503 U.S. 131 (1992).
131 Id. at 134-35.
132 id.
Vol. 109
THE TWOMBLY/IQBAL PROBLEM
judicial power of the United States described in Article III of the
Constitution. The Rules, then, must be deemed to apply only if their
application will not impermissibly expand the judicial authority conferred
by Article II1. 1"
Some federal district courts have cited Willy and Federal Rules 1 and 81 to
support using the Twombly/lIqbal standard when deciding questions of fraudulent
joinder.'34 For example, in Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., the court analyzed
the question of the applicable pleading standard this way:
In diversity actions, federal courts apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81 (c)(1), "The[ ] [federal] rules apply
to a civil action after it has been removed from a state court." See also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Federal procedural rules also apply pending a resolution
of the district court's jurisdiction. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,
134-135, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). Therefore, Plaintiffs'
arguments regarding application of Kentucky's pleading standards are
without merit.
3 5
Courts that rely on Willy to find that the federal pleading standard applies to
questions of fraudulent joinder, as the court did in Beavers, skip the second part of
the Willy analysis. The full analysis required by Willy shows that applying the
Twombly/lqbal pleading standard to determine fraudulent joinder impermissibly
expands the diversity jurisdiction conferred by Article 11 in contravention of the
Rules Enabling Act and the removal statute.
C. The state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test complies with the
requirement that courts narrowly construe the removal statute.
To respect principles of comity and federalism and ensure that state courts are
able to exercise their rightful authority, federal courts should strictly construe the
removal statute, as the United States Supreme Court has long recognized.136
Referring to the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Healy
v. Ratta said:
The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction. The power
reserved to the states, under the Constitution (Amendment 10), to provide
for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted
only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of
133 Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
134 "These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States dislrict courts,
except as stated in Rule 81. They should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FEm. R. Civ. P. 1.
135 Beavers v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 1:11 dp 20275, 2012 WL 1945603, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
May 30, 2012) (citations omitted).
136 Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); see also Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d
754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[B]ecause they implicate federalism concerns, removal statutes are to be
narrowly construed.").
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the Constitution (article 3). Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they
scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined.
37
The state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test complies with the Supreme Court's
instruction that federal courts should strictly construe the removal statute. In doing
so, this test respects the autonomy and jurisdiction of state courts.
This test also goes hand-in-hand with the requirement that federal courts sitting
in diversity apply state substantive law)3
8 If, as federal courts assert, the test for
fraudulent joinder is less burdensome than that applied to a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim,'39 it makes little sense for a federal district court to look to
the more stringent Twombly/lqbal "plausible on its face" pleading standard when
analyzing questions of fraudulent joinder.4 0
Although federalism concerns will arise in any case that raises a claim of
fraudulent joinder, those concerns are perhaps most acute in cases where a federal
court would more likely find the claim against the non-diverse defendant fails to
meet the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard-claims that raise novel issues of state
law or issues on which state law is ambiguous.
4 ' Federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction over cases that raise those sorts of claims interfere with state autonomy
and also produce significant functional consequences.'
42 The American Law Institute
describes one such consequence as follows:
The diversion of state law litigation to federal tribunals that is fostered by
the availability of diversity jurisdiction retards the formation and
development of state law; to the extent that unsettled questions of state
law are thus kept away from the state courts-and that extent can be, and
at times has been, substantial and important-authoritative resolution of
these questions is at least delayed and at times precluded.
43
In cases that present novel or ambiguous questions of state law, it may be difficult
for the federal court to determine whether the plaintiff has presented a "colorable
claim" under state law, particularly if the court looks to the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard.'44 In cases that raised novel claims or presented questions upon which state
law was ambiguous, the federal court would likely find that the claim against the
non-diverse defendant did not meet the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard and thus
"17 Healy, 292 U.S. at 270.
... Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
"9 Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2012) ("When deciding a motion to
remand, including fraudulent joinder allegations, we apply a test similar to, but more lenient than, the
analysis applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.").
'40 Combs v. ICG Hazard, L.L.C., 934 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
141 Percy, supra note 4, at 235-36.
42 AM. LAW INST., supra note 7, at 99.
143 Id.
'44 See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1674-76 (1992) ("Difficulty arises when the federal courts must predict
how the highest court of the state would decide the issue.").
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conclude that the plaintiff had fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. The
federal court would then dismiss the claim against the non-diverse defendant for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'45 That dismissal, if on the
merits, could preclude the plaintiff from re-filing the claim against the non-diverse
defendant in state court.'4 6 The state supreme court could not review the federal
court's decision, and the federal court's decision would prevent the state courts from
developing state law and policy on the claim raised by the plaintiff against the
non-diverse defendant.147 Such results incentivize forum shopping (removal) by
defendants in cases that raise novel questions of state law or that raise claims upon
which state law is ambiguous. Application of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard
would tip the scales in favor of a finding of fraudulent joinder in cases that present
claims that are novel or involve questions upon which state law is ambiguous.
Even if the federal district court disposed of the claim against the non-diverse
defendant in a way that would not have preclusive effect, it might be cost-prohibitive
for the plaintiff to pursue the claim against the non-diverse defendant in state court.
Litigating parallel claims simultaneously in both state and federal court would likely
result in duplicating the same efforts in each case, thereby increasing the expense of
litigation for the plaintiff. It would also be judicially inefficient to have both a state
and federal court hearing cases with common claims. And parallel litigation of claims
with common facts could lead to inconsistent outcomes between the case heard in
state court and the case heard in federal court.
Federal courts sitting in diversity and deciding novel or ambiguous questions of
state law also squander limited federal court resources.'4 8 The federal courts'
decisions interpreting ambiguous or novel questions of state law apply, for the most
part, only to the parties to the litigation, so they lend little, if anything, to authoritative
development of state law.'4 9 Federal courts interpreting ambiguous or novel
questions of state law also increase the risk of creating conflicting decisions between
an earlier federal court decision and a later state court decision.5 ° Such conflicting
"' See, e.g., Mills v. Woodford Nat'l Bank, No. 3:14-CV-00639-TBR, 2015 WL 1136502, at *3-4
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 12, 2015) (granting the non-diverse defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and denying motion for remand).
146 Walton v. Bayer Corp., 643 F.3d 994, 1001 (7th Cir. 2011) ("So clear is this that the district court
was right to invoke fraudulent joinder as a ground for dismissing Niemann from the case, with prejudice,
leaving only diverse defendants."); Carey v. Sub Sea Int'l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (E.D.
Tex. 2000), affd, 285 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs could not refile claims in state court
that had been dismissed by federal court based on a finding of fraudulent joinder); Rogers v. City of
Whitehall, 494 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 (Ohio 1986) ("We hold that a claim litigated to finality in the United
States district court cannot be relitigated in a state court when the state claim involves the identical subject
matter previously litigated in the federal court, and there is present no issue of party or privity.").
147 Percy, supra note 4, at 236.
148 AM. LAW INST., supra note 7, at 99-100 ("From the point of view of the federal courts, the task of
deciding such cases under state law imposes especially laborious burdens, often greater in fact than
involved in resolving issues of federal law on which those courts may speak with their own authority. And
although they may occasionally contribute to the development of state law, those heavy labors are
essentially wasteful.").
149 Id. at 100.
'
5
See id. at 99-100.
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results could negatively affect confidence in the judicial system, particularly for the
party that lost in federal court:
In those cases in which an issue of state law is ultimately decided by the
highest court of the state differently from a prior decision of the federal
court, the losing federal litigant will feel aggrieved if it is explained to him
that he would have won had his case been in the state court. That sense of
grievance will be compounded when, given the choice, he would have
preferred the state court in the first place.
151
How much more would the sense of grievance be compounded in a case where
the federal district court found the plaintiff had fraudulently joined a non-diverse
defendant and retained jurisdiction over a case the plaintiff had filed in state court?
These concerns are eliminated, or at least minimized, if the federal district court
applies the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test.
The state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test also ties in well with the current law
on fraudulent joinder analysis in cases that raise novel issues of state law or on which
state law is ambiguous. Because removal, even absent a claim of fraudulent joinder,
raises federalism issues, courts must strictly construe the removal statute.'
52 It is also
well settled that courts deciding fraudulent joinder must construe disputed questions
of fact and ambiguities in state law in favor of the non-removing party and resolve
all doubts about removal in favor of remand.'
53 The state-court failure-to-state-a-
claim test makes those things simpler to do because the federal district court need
only determine whether the plaintiffs claim would survive a motion to dismiss in
state court and any doubt as to that question should result in remand. Applying these
standards, cases that raise novel issues or questions upon which state law is
ambiguous would be more likely to survive a motion to dismiss under a notice
pleading standard than the Twombly/lqbal standard and thus, the federal courts
would be less likely to find that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse
defendant. This, in turn, would provide opportunities for state courts to develop state
law and would preserve scarce federal judicial resources.
D. The circuit courts that apply a state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test.
In Stillwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a trial court's decision that found the plaintiff had fraudulently joined a
non-diverse defendant.5 4 In that case, Stillwell, a Georgia citizen, had purchased a
landlord insurance policy from Allstate, an Illinois corporation.'
55 A fire damaged
the property for which the insurance had been purchased.1
56 The property later
suffered water damage.'57 Allstate denied claims related to the fire and water
' Id. at 100.
152 Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994).
153 See Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999).
114 Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11 th Cir. 2011).
' Id. at 1331.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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damage, so Stillwell filed two actions in Georgia state court.158 In the first, he sued
Allstate alleging it had breached the insurance contract and acted in bad faith when
it denied the claim for water damage.159 "Allstate removed th[at] case to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction."'160 Stillwell then sued Allstate and the Georgia
insurance agency that had sold him the policy for denial of the claim for damage
caused by the fire.16 ' In that suit, Stillwell alleged that Allstate had breached the
insurance contract and acted in bad faith, and he alleged that the insurance agency
had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to procure appropriate insurance
coverage.'62 Allstate also removed that case to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction.'63 Stillwell moved to remand the second case to state court.164 He argued
there was no diversity jurisdiction because he and the defendant insurance agency
were both citizens of Georgia.'65 The federal district court denied the motion to
remand and found that Stillwell had fraudulently joined the insurance agency.'66 The
federal district court dismissed the claim against the insurance agency, consolidated
the two cases against Allstate, and granted summary judgment for Allstate.'67
Stillwell appealed.'68
On appeal, Stillwell argued that the federal district court had erroneously applied
the Twombly/lIqbal pleading standard when deciding his motion for remand.'69 The
court of appeals agreed.7 ° To reach its decision, the court looked to Georgia law
applicable to Stillwell's claim against the insurance agency.'7' The court first
recognized that under Georgia law, an insurance agent can be held liable for
negligently failing to procure insurance.172 The court then noted an exception to that
rule where the agent secured the policy but the insured failed to read the policy to
determine whether the policy covered a particular risk.'73 Under Georgia law, the
agent could not be held liable if the insured failed to read the policy. 174 The court
then discussed two exceptions to the exception: the agent could be held liable where
the agent held himself out as an expert or when there was a special relationship
between the insured and the agent.
175
158 id.
159 Id.
60 Id.161 Id. at 1331-32.
1
62 Id. at 1332.
163 id.
164id
165 Id.
166 id.
167 id.
168 id.
1
69 
Id. at 1333.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 id.
174 id.
175 d. at 1333-34.
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Stillwell claimed both exceptions applied, so he argued that the insurance agency
could be held liable for its failure to procure appropriate insurance.
176 For the expert
exception, Stillwell alleged that the insurance agency held itself out as an expert and
that he reasonably relied on the agency's expertise to procure the appropriate
insurance. 177 As to the special-relationship exception, Stillwell alleged that there was
a special relationship between him and the insurance agency and that he relied on the
insurance agency to determine the appropriate insurance coverage.
178
The federal district court had found that Stillwell's allegations against the
insurance agency were conclusory and lacked factual specificity under the
TwomblylIqbal standard, so it concluded that Stillwell had fraudulently joined the
insurance agency.179 The court of appeals rejected the district court's analysis saying,
"disregarding allegations as conclusory and requiring them to contain a certain
amount of factual matter sounds a lot like the 12(b)(6) standard, not the fraudulent
joinder standard."'0 The court of appeals then held that the federal district court
should have looked to the state pleading standard:
Nothing in our precedents concerning fraudulent joinder requires anything
more than conclusory allegations or a certain level of factual specificity.
All that is required are allegations sufficient to establish "even a
possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause
of action against any one of the resident defendants." To determine
whether it is possible that a state court would find that the complaint states
a cause of action, we must necessarily look to the pleading standards
applicable in state court, not the plausibility pleading standards prevailing
in federal court.1"'
The court of appeals then concluded that Stillwell had met Georgia's
notice-pleading standard and ordered that the fire damage case be remanded to- state
court.' 
82
Stillwell stands for the proposition that federal courts should look to the state
pleading standard (and necessarily the standard applicable to a state court motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) when deciding
questions of fraudulent joinder. And although the Stillwell court did not discuss the
federalism or state sovereignty concerns that would arise from applying the
heightened Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, it seems a fair inference that such
concerns, though unspoken, underlaid its analysis.
Two other circuits, the First and Ninth, have applied the state-law failure-to-state-
a-claim test to questions of fraudulent joinder, although neither addressed the issue
176 1d. at 1334.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1332, 1334.
"o Id. at 1334.
1"1 Id. (citation omitted).
182 Id. at 1334-35.
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in light of the Twombly/Iqbal standard.183 The First Circuit has held that "removal is
not defeated by the joinder of a non-diverse defendant where there is no reasonable
possibility that the state's highest court would find that the complaint states a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted against the non-diverse defendant.'184
The Ninth Circuit, in a case decided before Twombly and Iqbal, said that, "[i]f the
plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is
obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident
defendant is fraudulent.'1
85
Sixth Circuit precedent also supports the state-law failure-to-state-a-claim test.
In Alexander v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, which was also decided
before Twombly and Jqbal, the Sixth Circuit held that federal district courts must
look to state law when assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings in a case removed
to federal court.'86 In Alexander, the plaintiff, a Michigan citizen, sued a Texas
corporation, its manager, personnel manager, and staffing manager in Michigan state
court alleging state law claims of disability discrimination and fraud and
misrepresentation.87 The managers were all citizens of Michigan.'88 The Texas
corporation removed the case to federal court and asserted, alternatively, federal
question jurisdiction because the plaintiffs claims were related to a plan covered by
ERISA or diversity jurisdiction because the non-diverse defendants had been
fraudulently joined. '8 9
The Sixth Circuit found there was no federal question jurisdiction'90 and then
turned to the fraudulent joinder question. The court first addressed the claim of fraud
and misrepresentation against the non-diverse defendants.'9 ' The court said that:
In addressing the sufficiency of pleadings, we must look to state law. In
Michigan, "an action in fraud must definitely and issuably set forth the
facts complained of and relied upon for recovery." "A mere allegation or
claim of fraud is not sufficient to establish a cause of action based
thereon."'
92
The court suggested the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded the fraud claim under
state law.'93
The court then considered whether the plaintiff could establish that the
non-diverse defendants were employers or agents and thus whether the defendants
113 See Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc., 765 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2014);
McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).
184 Universal Truck & Equip. Co., 765 F.3d at 108.
115 McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339.
186 Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1994).
117 Id. at 941.
'88 Id. at 942, 948.
8 9 
Id. at 942.
'90 ld. at 947.
191Id. at 948.
192 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Dutkiewicz v. Bartkowiak, 126 N.W.2d
705, 706 (1964); and then quoting Hager v. Hager, 125 N.W.2d 865, 867 (1964)).
'9' See id. at 948-49.
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could be held liable for discrimination under Michigan law.
19 4 The Sixth Circuit
remanded the case to the federal district court to determine whether it had diversity
jurisdiction and "specifically whether [the non-diverse defendants] were fraudulently
joined." '195
When the Alexander court directed the district court to look to state law to
determine the sufficiency of the pleadings, it recognized the preeminent role of state
law in the fraudulent joinder analysis. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Alexander
supports adopting the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test.
These cases show that the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test is a workable
standard and that federal courts will have little difficulty applying it.
E. Application of the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test is consistent
with other precedent.
Some courts have looked to the reasoning of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc. '96 to support applying the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test.
For example, In re Regions Morgan Keegan Securities, Derivative, and ERISA
Litigation'97 applied the Sixth Circuit's decision in Miller v. Davis, which was based
on Byrd,9 ' and concluded that it was appropriate to look to the state pleading
standard to determine the question of fraudulent joinder.' 
99
In Miller, the Sixth Circuit set forth a three-part test to determine whether a
federal district court, sitting in diversity, should apply a state procedural rule2°":
1. If the state provision is the substantive right or obligation being
asserted, the federal court must apply it.
2. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is intimately bound up
with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, the federal court
must apply it.
3. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is not intimately bound
up with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, but its
application might substantially change the outcome of the litigation, the
federal court should determine whether state interests in favor of applying
the state rule outweigh countervailing federal considerations against
application of the rule. If the state interests predominate, the state rule
should be adopted.2'
Under the three-part Miller test, federal courts would be required to apply the
state pleading standard to questions of fraudulent joinder. The state procedural rule
1
94 Id. at 949.
195 Id.
196 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
197 Nos. 2:09-md-2009-SHM, 2:10-CV-02260-SHM-dkv, 2013 WL 2404063 (W.D. Tenn. May31, 2013).
19 Miller v Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 313-14 (6th Cir. 1974).
"9 In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., 2013 WL 2404063, at *8-9.
2-6 Miller, 507 F.2d at 314.
211 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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is intimately bound up with the substantive right because the state procedural rule
(notice pleading) determines whether the substantive claim survives a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. And it will
always be the case that application of the state pleading standard might substantially
change the outcome of the litigation. A federal district court might find fraudulent
joinder if it applied the heightened Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard but find proper
joinder if it applied a state notice-pleading standard. In re Regions Morgan Keegan
Securities20 2 illustrates this point.
The court in In re Regions Morgan Keegan Securities applied the Miller
three-part test and, in doing so, recognized that "[t]he applicable pleading standard,
which is a procedural rather than substantive issue, can be dispositive of the question
of diversity jurisdiction. 203 There, the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations
against the non-diverse defendant were conclusory and would not have satisfied the
federal Twombly/lIqbal pleading standard °.2 ' The court looked to the state
notice-pleading standard and concluded, however, that the plaintiffs' claims alleged
all of the elements of their causes of action against the non-diverse defendant and
were sufficient to give the non-diverse defendant fair notice of the claims against
him and the kind of evidence that might be needed to prove those claims.2 05 The court
found that "[a]pplication of the federal pleading standard would.., produce the
opposite result from application of the [state] pleading standard.""2 6
After making that determination, the court applied step three of the Miller test
and balanced the state and federal interests.20 7 It noted the state's interest in allowing
notice pleading and the federal interest in the efficiency of multidistrict litigation.208
The court also detailed the federalism concerns that favored applying the state
procedural rule.2" 9 It first emphasized that the basic issue was whether the court had
subject-matter jurisdiction.210 It found that if it applied the federal procedural
rule-the Twombly/lqbal pleading standard-the court would have jurisdiction
because the plaintiff had not met the heightened pleading standard so the non-diverse
defendant had been fraudulently joined; but if it applied the state notice-pleading
standard, the court would lack jurisdiction because the non-diverse defendant would
have been properly joined and remand would be required.21 1 The court then noted
the limited jurisdiction of federal courts and said, "[s]o, although 'there is a federal
interest in having federal courts adjudicate all cases properly brought under a
202 In re Regions Morgan Keegan Sec., 2013 WL 2404063. This case was originally filed in a Texas
state court. Id. at *1. The "[d]efendants removed the [case] to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas," asserting both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Id. The case was
transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee upon an order of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Id.
203 Id. at *8-9 (citation omitted).
'04Id. at *11.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
201 Id. at *12.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 id.
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jurisdictional grant from Congress,' there is an equally strong interest in not
overstepping the bounds of jurisdiction and not deciding, without authority, cases
that are properly before state courts. '21 2 Finally, the court noted the federal interest
in discouraging forum shopping.2 13 After considering all of these interests, the court
found that the state's interests predominated, and thus it applied the state pleading
standard, determined that the non-diverse defendant had not been fraudulently
joined, and remanded the case to state court.
214
F. The courts that have applied the Twombly/lqbal standard to questions of
fraudulentjoinder failed to consider the federalism and state sovereignty
concerns inherent in their decisions.
In International Energy Ventures Management, L.L. C. v. United Energy Group,
Ltd., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Twombly/lIqbal standard applies
to questions of fraudulent joinder.215 To reach its decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on
three things: its decision in Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,2"
6 a case that
was decided before Twombly and Iqbal; dictum from the Supreme Court's decision
in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp.,217 which was decided before Willy v.
Coastal Corp.;2"8 and "practical reasons."
2 9 None of those three things require
federal courts to apply the Twombly/lIqbal pleading standard when resolving
questions of fraudulent joinder.
In Smallwood, which was decided five years before Iqbal, the Fifth Circuit said,
"[o]rdinarily, if a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no improper
joinder. '22 0 But the court in Smallwood did not say whether it was referring to a state
Rule 12(b)(6) standard or a federal Rule 12(b)(6) standard, because, at the time, there
was no difference between the two-both were based on a notice-pleading standard-
So even had the Smallwood court specifically referenced the federal pleading
standard as it existed in 2004 (notice pleading), its decision would not require federal
courts to apply the Twombly/Iqbal standard.
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Grubbs. The
Fifth Circuit said:
In its opinion in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., the Supreme
Court reiterated that "[w]hile, of course, [a state] is free to establish such
rules of practice for her own courts as she chooses, the removal statutes
212 Id. (quoting Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 317 (6th Cir. 1974)).
213 Id.
2 14 Id. at *13.
2 1
1 Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt, L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193,203-04,208 (5th Cir. 2016).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also looked to the Twombly/lIqbal pleading standard when reviewing a question
of fraudulentjoinder in Roggio v. McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Capenter. 415 F. App'x 432,433 (3d Cir. 2011)
(providing no rationale for its decision to apply the Twombly/Iqbal standard).
216 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004).
217 405 U.S. 699, 705 (1972).
21 503 U.S. 131 (1992).
219 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 202-08.
220 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573.
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and decisions of this Court are intended to have uniform nationwide
application." It stated that federal law "must be construed as setting up its
own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what instances
suits are to be removed from the state to the federal courts."'22 1
But the issue in Grubbs was whether a party could challenge a removal procedure
after a federal district court had entered judgment when the court had jurisdiction at
the time it entered judgment.222 Grubbs had nothing to do with state pleading
standards, and the state rules of civil procedure played no role in the Court's
decision.223 Thus, the language upon which the Fifth Circuit relied was dictum. The
Fifth Circuit also failed to mention or consider the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Willy, which held that a federal court should apply state procedural rules
if applying the federal rules would impermissibly expand the court's Article I
jurisdiction.
224
The Fifth Circuit also cited "practical reasons" to support its decision: chiefly, its
conclusion that the Twombly/lqbal standard would be easier for the federal courts to
apply because of the familiarity of federal courts with that standard.25 The Fifth
Circuit's rationale is unpersuasive in this regard. First, federal "courts have
continued to be confused [by the Twombly/lIqbal] standard [] and how and when it
should be applied.'226 Second, federal courts sitting in diversity already interpret and
apply state substantive law,227 so it seems unlikely that they would have difficulty
applying a state notice-pleading standard, which, recall, looks to state substantive
law.2 8 Further, practical considerations do not justify applying the Twombly/Iqbal
standard when doing so would expand the scope of diversity jurisdiction beyond the
bounds set by the Constitution. The Fifth Circuit also said:
[B]y uniformly applying the federal pleading standard, we ensure that the
scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction does not differ serendipitously
from state to state and district to district, because of nothing more than an
accident of geography. We will thus avoid any differences attributable to
nothing more than the whim and fancy of the laws in our three states.229
This reasoning fails to consider federalism principles and fails to respect state
sovereignty. State laws, whether procedural or substantive, are not "whim and fancy"
based on "accident[s] of geography." State laws reflect the considered will of the
221 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 202-03 (footnotes omitted).
222 Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 700 ("We have concluded that, whether or not the case was properly removed,
the District Court did have jurisdiction of the parties at the time it entered judgment. Under such
circumstances the validity of the removal procedure followed may not be raised for the first time on
appeal, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.").
223 See id. at 705-06.
224 Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992).
225 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 208.
226 Michelle S. Simon, Hogan vs. Gawker II. A Statutory Solution to Fraudulent Joinder, 70 BAYLOR
L. REv. 1, 35 (2018).
227 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
221 See supra Section I.B.
229 Int'l Energy Ventures, 818 F.3d at 208.
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people of those states as reflected by their elected representatives and judges. For
instance, some states have considered and rejected the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard.3 ' Federal courts should respect the decisions of the courts in those states
and apply the state procedural rules when to do otherwise would "impermissibly
expand the judicial authority conferred by Article fIl."' Courts that apply the
heightened Twomblyl Iqbal pleading standard fail to "scrupulously confine" their
jurisdiction as required by Healy v. Ratta23
While the state-court failure-to-state-a-claim test respects principles of
federalism and state sovereignty, a test that applied the Twombly/Iqbal standard
would further erode state sovereignty. The Twombly/Iqbal heightened pleading
standard "create[s] perverse incentives" '233 and nullifies more lenient state pleading
standards. Attorneys filing claims in state court might anticipate removal and seek to
meet the Twomblyllqbal pleading standard, and thus deprive their clients of the
benefits of the state's notice-pleading standard.23
4 In fact, one author has advised
plaintiff attorneys that "[t]he best practice is to draft your complaint with an eye to
meeting the federal pleading requirement and to be detailed in your factual
allegations."'35 Nullifying more lenient state notice-pleading standards is a
particularly "perverse incentive" where the plaintiff wants to raise a novel claim or
a claim upon which state law is ambiguous. It might be difficult or impossible for
plaintiffs in those cases to meet the heightened pleading standard; it might also make
it more difficult for potential plaintiffs to find counsel willing to pursue such claims.
Application of the Twombly/lIqbal standard might also encourage defendants to
remove cases to federal court and then argue that the non-diverse defendant was
fraudulently joined.236 Defendants in those cases would anticipate that the federal
230 E.g., Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014) ("With this history in mind,
we now decline to engraft the plausibility standard from Twombly and Iqbal onto our traditional
interpretation of Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. We decline to do so despite the fact that the relevant text of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) is identical to the text of Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01."); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat
for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tenn. 2011) ("We address the issue of the proper standard for
Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal. We decline to
adopt the new Twombly/lqbal 'plausibility' pleading standard and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals." (citations omitted)); see also Ukau v. Wang, No. CVAI 5-008, 2016 WL 4582244, at *5 (Guam
Aug. 31, 2016) ("With this background in mind, we now decline to adopt the plausibility standard from
Twonbly and Iqbal, choosing instead to rely on our traditional interpretation of GRCP 8(a).").
231 Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992).
232 See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
233 Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d 863, 869 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
234 See id.
235 Brenda M. Johnson, Rebounding from Fraudulent Joinder, TRIAL, Dec. 2018, at 36, 38.
236 But see Curry & Ward, supra note 15, at 829 ("There was no systematic increase in the rate of
removal from state to federal courts after Twombly and Iqbal, and the effect was not more pronounced in
notice-pleading states compared to fact-pleading states."). Curry and Ward noted that while their study
did not find support for the conclusion that the Twombly/lqbal standard had an effect on the rate of removal
in states that retain the notice-pleading standard, they acknowledged that their "study does not eliminate
the possibility." Id. at 872. Even assuming the Twombly/lqbal standard does not affect the rate of removal,
it may be that the rate of remand is decreased in federal district courts that apply the Twombly/lqbal
standard when deciding questions of fraudulent joinder.
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court would ultimately dismiss the claim against the non-diverse defendant under the
heightened Twombly/lqbal standard.37
These "perverse incentives" either expand the scope of federal diversity
jurisdiction in violation of Article II1, Section 2 by allowing federal courts to retain
jurisdiction over cases that are otherwise properly filed in state court, or they violate
principles of federalism by de facto imposing the federal pleading standard on claims
filed in state court.
G. Other proposed tests do not solve the federalism and state sovereignty
problems or are likely to lead to judicial inefficiency.
Some have proposed that courts adopt a uniform test for fraudulent joinder based
on the Twombly/Iqbal standard or some other standard. Those proposals, however,
would either lead to additional litigation or fail to respect state autonomy.
Congress has twice considered legislation to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1447 to impose
a uniform test for fraudulent joinder. In the 114th Congress, H.R. 3624, the
Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act,238 was passed by the House of Representatives
but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.239 The 115th Congress considered an
identical bill, the Innocent Party Protection Act.240 That bill also passed the House
but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.24 ' Among other things, those bills would
have codified a requirement that federal courts use the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard to evaluate claims of fraudulent joinder. 42
211 See Jackson, 57 F. Supp. 3d. at 869.
238 Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. (2016).
239 H.R 3624-Frau&.dentJoinderPreventionActof2O16, CONGREss.cov,httpsJAvww.congress.gov/bill1 14th-
congresshouse-bii3624/all-acions?overview--closedtabs [htps//erma.cc/3DJY-3CET].
240 Innocent Party Protection Act, H.R. 725, 115th Cong. (2017).
241 H.R. 725-Innocent Party Protection Act, CONGRESs.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 15th-
congress/house-bill/725/all-action s?overview---closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/M89J-S6XZ].
242 The relevant provision in the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016 reads as follows:
Section 1447 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(f) FRAUDULENT JOINDER.-
"(I) This subsection shall apply to any case in which-
"(A) a civil action is removed solely on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section
1332(a);
"(B) a motion to remand is made on the ground that-
"(i) one or more defendants are citizens of the same State as one or more plaintiffs; or
"(ii) one or more defendants properly joined and served are citizens of the State in which the
action was brought; and
"(C) the motion is opposed on the ground that the joinder of the defendant or defendants
described in subparagraph (B) is fraudulent.
"(2) The joinder of the defendant or defendants described in paragraph (I)(B) is fraudulent if
the court finds that-
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Those bills would have required a finding of fiaudulent joinder if, "based on the
complaint and [and supplemental materials such as affidavits], it is not plausible to
conclude that applicable State law would impose liability on [that] defendant."
'243 As
one commentator, who helped draft the legislation,
2" noted, "[This] replaces
standards like 'no possibility of recovery' with a uniform standard of 'plausibility'
drawn from the Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions that redefined the
federal pleading standard ....
The legislation also contained a provision that would have allowed the federal
district court to permit the plaintiff to amend her pleadings because "the plaintiff,
having filed a complaint in state court under state procedural rules, may not have
anticipated application of a 'plausibility' or other Federal standard.
246 This
provision would have abrogated current case law, which generally holds that when
deciding questions of fraudulent joinder, federal courts cannot consider post-removal
pleadings that attempt to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
2 47 That the drafters of the
legislation included this provision shows that they recognized that the applicable
pleading standard could be outcome determinative on questions of fraudulent
joinder.
Proponents of the legislation claimed it would prevent forum shopping and
protect local businesses and individuals from being sued in cases in which they "had
only a tangential or peripheral role. '248 Opponents argued the legislation was "the
latest attempt to tilt the civil justice playing field in favor of corporate defendants.
249
Policy arguments aside, there are reasons to be concerned with the federalism
issues inherent in the proposed legislation and the effect such legislation would have
on state sovereignty.2Y0 One scholar has argued that the legislation would have
"(A) there is actual fraud in the pleading ofjunisdictional facts;
"(B) based on the complaint and the materials submitted under paragraph (3), it is not plausible
to conclude that applicable State law would impose liability on each defendant... ;
"(C) State or Federal law clearly bars all claims in the complaint against all defendants... ; or
"(D) objective evidence clearly demonstrates that there is no good faith intention to prosecute
the action against all defendants ... or to seek ajoint judgment.
"'(3) In determining whether to grant or deny a motion under paragraph (1 )(B), the court may
permit the pleadings to be amended, and shall consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other
evidence submitted by the parties.
"(4) If the court finds fraudulent joinder under paragraph (2), it shall dismiss without prejudice
the claims against the defendant or defendants found to have been fraudulently joined and shall
deny the motion described in paragraph (1)(B).".
H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
243 id.
244 Arthur D. Hellman, The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: A New Standard and a New
Rationale for an Old Doctrine, FEDERALIST SOC'Y REv., June 2016, at 34, 36.
245 Id. at 38.
246 H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 16 (2016).
247 Dotson v. Elite Oil Field Servs., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870 (N.D. W. Va. 2015) (collecting cases).
248 H.R. REP. NO. 114-422, at 3-4 (2016).
249 Id. at 18.
250 Id. at 26-27.
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intruded on the states' ability to shape state substantive and procedural law-the
former by preventing state courts from deciding claims that raise novel or ambiguous
questions of state law; the latter because many states have not adopted the
Twombly/Jqbal pleading standard.251' But "[t]he bill clearly contemplate[d] that when
a case [was] removed to federal court based upon fraudulent joinder, the plaintiffs
complaint must satisfy the federal standard, even though it may be remanded back
to state court for lack of jurisdiction.'
252
Another scholar, downplaying the federalism and state sovereignty concerns,
argued that the proposed legislation would likely have a negligible effect on the
development of state law.253 He argued that the federalism and state sovereignty
concerns were "unrealistic for the general run of fraudulent joinder cases" because
the state appellate courts, rather than the state trial courts, shape state law. 4 He
continued that, in cases where the federal court had found that the plaintiff had
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant, the claims against the non-diverse
defendant were "marginal at best."55 Thus, he concluded that "[t]he likelihood that
these marginal claims would be decided on the merits at the trial level and ultimately
decided by an appellate court seem[ed] quite remote."'256
The proponent of the legislation did not respond to the federalism concern that,
by adopting a plausibility standard, the legislation would have given federal courts
"the power to shape state pleading law."257 As an opponent of the legislation noted:
When a suit is maintained in state court, the applicable pleading standard
may not be the plausibility standard articulated in Iqbal. Yet when a
Federal court is required to review a state law claim in the context of a
remand motion, it will effectively be applying the heightened Iqbal
pleading standard to the plaintiff's claims against an in-state or local
defendant, progressively undermining the authority of state courts to set
their own pleading standards for state court cases.258
This would incentivize the careful plaintiffs attorney to draft her state-court
complaint with an eye toward meeting the heightened federal pleading standard,
again, depriving her client of the benefit of the more lenient state pleading
standard.2 59 The fear of removal might also deprive those with "marginal" claims of
access to counsel because a plaintiffs attorney would be less likely to file such
claims for fear that the case would be removed and then the claim against the
non-diverse defendant would be dismissed by the federal court.
The provision in the proposed legislation that would have allowed the plaintiff
to amend her complaint prior to the federal district court deciding whether the
251 Percy, supra note 4, at 235-37.
252 Id. at 237; see also Simon, supra note 226, at 38-39.
253 See Hellman, supra note 244, at 43.
254 id.
255 id.
256 id.
257 H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 26 (2016).
258 Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
259 Jackson v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d. 863, 869 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
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plaintiff had fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant would not resolve the state
sovereignty concerns. Instead, the plaintiff, who wanted to litigate her claims in state
court in the first instance, is forced to meet the heightened Twombly/lIqbal standard,
just so she can have her case remanded to state court (assuming she then could meet
the plausibility standard), where the Twombly/lIqbal standard never applied.
Further, this legislation, a perceived cure for one ill-forum shopping by
plaintiffs-would lead to another ill--encouraging defendants to remove cases when
the non-diverse defendant was not fraudulently joined.
26° Defendants face little risk
by employing such tactics, and, even in cases that are remanded to state court, the
defendants will have obtained the benefit of delay and the plaintiffs will have
incurred the cost of time and money expended litigating the question of fraudulent
joinder.
2 61
Empirical evidence seems to support the theory that adopting the Twombly/lqbal
standard would incentivize defendants to remove cases on specious claims of
fraudulent joinder. A 2008 study, which analyzed data from 2004 and 2006
(pre-Twombly), found that in one district in 2004, 50% of cases that had been
removed based on claims of fraudulent joinder were remanded to state court, while
only 27% of other removed cases were remanded to state court.
26 2 The author found
that cases alleging fraudulent joinder were far more likely to be remanded than other
removed cases.263 It follows that defendants would think their odds of successfully
removing a case and arguing fraudulent joinder would be better were the federal
court required to apply the heightened Twomblyllqbal plausibility standard.
Another proposal set forth a two-part test that first looks to the plausibility
standard under Twombly/Iqbal and then shifts to a modified summary judgment-type
analysis.21 Under this proposed test, if the plaintiff cannot meet the Twombly/Iqbal
standard, which would ordinarily warrant dismissal, the removing defendant must
show, by clear and convincing evidence, "that the plaintiff has not introduced any
facts beyond the complaint, which gives rise to a plausible claim for 
relief."265
Tofighbakhsh v. Wells Fargo & Co.26 6 was used to support the proposed two-part
test.267 In Tofighbakhsh, the district court considered matters outside the complaint
to decide the question of fraudulent joinder-information the plaintiff found on
Wells Fargo's website and affidavits submitted by the defendant.
268 The court
remanded the case based on that additional evidence.
269
260 Percy, supra note 4, at 222.
261 Id. at 235.
262 Christopher Terranova, Erroneous Removal as a Tool for Silent Tort Reform: An Empirical
Analysis of Fee Awards and Fraudulent Joinder, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799, 829 (2008); see also
Percy, supra note 4, at 234.
263 Terranova, supra note 262, at 832 ("For all of the four circuits, remand was more likely in
fraudulent joinder cases-from 6 to 12.5 times as likely.").
264 Pratt, supra note 70, at 766-69.
265 Id.
266 No. 10-830 SC, 2010 WL 2486412, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2010).
267 Pratt, supra note 70, at 769, 769 n.213.
268 Tofighbakhsh, 2010 WL 2486412, at *2.
269 Id. at *3.
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The proposed two-part test based on Tofighbakhsh would be inefficient and
would prolong litigation over the question of fraudulent joinder. Information needed
(for either the plaintiff or the removing defendant) to meet step two of the test might
be available only through discovery or might be in the hands of third parties and thus
not readily available to the parties to the litigation absent resort to processes to
compel its disclosure. A test that requires parties to submit additional evidence at the
pleading stage could delay the litigation, impose additional costs, and lead to
dismissal of claims that would survive a motion to dismiss under a state
notice-pleading standard.
Another article proposed a "bad faith" test that would work in conjunction with
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).27° 28 U.S.C. § 1446 contains two subsections that are
relevant here. The first provides:
[I]f the case stated by the initial pleadings is not removable, a notice of
removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant...
of a copy of an... order.., from which it may first be ascertained that
the case is one which is or has become removable.
271
A case based on diversity jurisdiction may not be removed under this subsection
more than one year after the action is commenced "unless the district court finds that
the plaintiff has acted in bad faith" to prevent removal.2 This subsection provides
the basis for the proposed "bad faith" test.273
Under the proposed bad faith test, if a state court dismissed the claim against a
non-diverse defendant, the diverse defendant could remove the case to federal
court.2 4 The federal court would then determine, under 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1),
whether the plaintiff had acted in bad faith in joining the non-diverse defendant in
the state court action.275 If the federal court found that the plaintiff had acted in bad
faith, for example by joining a non-diverse defendant who could not be held liable
under settled state law, then the case would remain in federal court.276 If the federal
court found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith, say by alleging a claim on
which the state law was unsettled, then the federal court would remand the case back
to state court.
277
The bad faith test would seem to eliminate some federalism and state sovereignty
concerns because it would be the state court, rather than the federal court, that would
determine the viability of the plaintiffs claim against the non-diverse defendant in
the first instance. But the bad faith test could lead to duplicative litigation with
inconsistent results and could create more procedural problems than it would solve.
270 Emily L. Buchanan, A Comity of Errors: Treading on State Court Jurisdiction in the Name of
Federalism, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (2013).
271 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(3) (2018).
272 Id. § 1446(c)(1).
27' Buchanan, supra note 270, at 22.
274 ld.
275 id.
276 Id.
2 7
7 Id. at 22-23.
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Imagine this hypothetical: A plaintiff sues a diverse and non-diverse defendant
in state court. The state trial court dismisses the claim against the non-diverse
defendant. The diverse defendant then removes the case to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals the state trial court's judgment dismissing
the claim against the non-diverse defendant to the state appellate court
278 and files a
motion in federal court to remand the claim against the diverse defendant. The
federal court finds that the plaintiffjoined the non-diverse defendant in bad faith, so
the federal court denies the plaintiff s motion to remand and retains jurisdiction over
the claim against the diverse defendant. The state appellate court then reverses the
state trial court's judgment dismissing the claim against the non-diverse defendant
and remands the case to the state trial court.
In this hypothetical, the plaintiff is left litigating related cases in two different
courts. The case against the diverse defendant remains in federal court and the now
remanded case against the non-diverse defendant remains in state court. The bad
faith test could lead to the anomalous situation of a state appellate court finding that
the plaintiff has a viable claim under state law (so the plaintiff did not act in bad faith
in joining the non-diverse defendant and the case should have remained in state
court), yet the claim against the diverse defendant is still in federal court.
Further, in our hypothetical, the federal court's decision on a motion for remand
could interfere with a state appellate court's jurisdiction. If the plaintiff had appealed
the state court's dismissal of the claim against the non-diverse defendant, and the
federal court then remanded the case against the diverse defendant to state court, a
question would arise as to whether the state appellate court had jurisdiction to hear
the appeal of the state court's dismissal of the claim against the non-diverse
defendant. Would the federal court's remand turn what had been a final appealable
order into an order that was not final and appealable? If it made the order
non-appealable, then the federal court's decision would affect the state appellate
court's jurisdiction, which raises another federalism and state sovereignty concern.
Courts have adopted the voluntary/involuntary rule to address the concerns raised
by our hypothetical.279 As one court explained:
This voluntary/involuntary distinction is grounded in the observation that
when a non-diverse party is eliminated from an action pursuant to court
order (i.e., involuntarily), the order of dismissal may be the subject of
appeal; consequently, although diversity may temporarily exist between
the parties, federal jurisdiction might ultimately be destroyed if the state
appellate court reverses the order of dismissal. In contrast, a voluntary
dismissal demonstrates a plaintiff's permanent intention not to pursue the
case against the non-diverse defendant. As a result, unlike an involuntary
278 There seems to be a split of authoity as to whether a state appellate court would even have jurisdiction to
hear the appeal of the dismissal of the state court claim. The court in Turner v. Healthcare Services Group, Inc. held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 deprived it ofjurisdiction to hear an appeal of the dismissal of claims against a non-diverse
defendant when the diverse defendant had removed the case after the state court dismissed the claims against the
non-diverse defendant Turner v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 431,433 (Mo. CL App. 2005). But see
Hayes v. Henley, 84 So. 3d 60,62 (Ala. 2011).
279 Wiacek v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 795 F. Supp. 223, 225 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(collecting cases).
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dismissal, a voluntary dismissal does not present a threat to continued
diversity, and courts will generally permit removal.
2
11
The bad faith test runs afoul of the voluntary/involuntary rule. While unlikely, it
is not inconceivable that, as in our hypothetical, a state court would reverse the
dismissal of a claim that a federal court had found was filed in bad faith, the very
scenario the voluntary/involuntary rule is meant to avoid.
It has also been argued that the state court failure-to-state-a-claim test "is both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive.,28 1 One scholar argued that the test would be
over-inclusive because it would allow removal when the court decided the plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, even if non-frivolous
arguments supported the claim.28 2 The argument is that in such cases the
failure-to-state-a-claim test would force federal courts to decide novel or ambiguous
questions of state law.283 The author then argued that "[t]he 'failure to state a claim'
test is under-inclusive because it prevents removal of cases where the plaintiff stated
a claim against the [non-diverse] defendant but had no reasonable factual basis for
such claim.
284
The article that raised these over-inclusive-under-inclusive concerns was written
before Twombly and Jqbal were decided, so it did not address the implication of those
decisions with respect to those concerns. The concerns that the state court
failure-to-state-a-claim test is over-inclusive are eliminated if the federal court
resolves ambiguous questions of state law and any doubts about the propriety of
removal in favor of remand. The concerns about under-inclusiveness how why the
state court failure-to-state-a-claim test better respects the principles of federalism and
state sovereignty after Twombly and Jqbal. If a state has retained the notice-pleading
standard, then a case should not be removable if the plaintiff has met the state's
notice-pleading standard. And the under-inclusiveness concerns will not come to
fruition in states that have adopted the Twombly/Iqbal standard because in those
states the plaintiff will have to plead sufficient facts to establish the basis for her
claim.
These tests that propose adopting a fraudulent joinder analysis based on
Twombly/Iqbal or some other heightened standard, while having the benefit of
applying a uniform standard, fail to address the tests' effects on federalism and state
sovereignty. They also have the potential to create additional procedural or
federalism issues. The state court failure-to-state-a-claim test has the benefit of
creating a uniform and easily workable standard that respects state autonomy and
avoids the creation of additional procedural problems.
280 Id.
281 Percy, supra note 6, at 218.
282 Id.
283 id.
2941id.
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CONCLUSION
The federal courts have not adopted a uniform test for questions of fraudulent
joinder, and the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have led to
additional confusion and inconsistency in the fraudulent joinder analysis in federal
district courts and a split among the circuit courts of appeals. The federal courts
should abandon their current tests and adopt the state law failure-to-state-a-claim test
to analyze questions of fraudulent joinder.
The state court failure-to-state-a-claim test respects state sovereignty. It ensures
that state courts are able to hear and decide claims that raise novel questions of state
law or questions upon which state law is ambiguous. It also ensures that more lenient
state court pleading standards are not co-opted by the fear of removal to federal court.
This test also ensures that federal courts do not exceed the constitutional limits of
their jurisdiction and it comports with Supreme Court precedent.
The test also respects and protects the authority of federal courts and scarce
federal judicial resources. It discourages removal but nonetheless would allow
removal in cases where the plaintiffs claim against the non-diverse defendant would
not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under the state pleading standard.
Finally, it is an easily workable test that is familiar to the courts and counsel. It
will simplify the analysis for plaintiffs, defendants, and the federal district courts.
This, in turn, will lead to more consistent results.
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